arXiv preprints from January 1, 2026 through September 5, 2026 — 23:24:58 EST
We study tournaments with managerial discretion in hiring. A manager selects a coworker from a pool of candidates and then competes against him in a Lazear--Rosen--style tournament with a prize equal to a share of total output. A profit-maximizing principal sets the prize share together with a head start (or handicap)---an advantage...
I provide the first analytic construction of a canonical Aiyagari economy exhibiting at least three steady states. Along the way, I provide new upper and lower bounds on the stationary capital supply for the case where the net return on saving is negative. I also give parameter restrictions that guarantee the existence of a steady...
We study robust mechanisms when the designer possesses a Bayesian belief over some components of agents' private information but faces ambiguity over others. The designer evaluates mechanisms by their worst-case performance over all joint distributions consistent with her belief over the Bayesian components. The framework encompasses...
People increasingly use language models to support life decisions. Many such decisions involve a probabilistic forecast: How likely is a major life event, a natural disaster, or an economic outcome? Users of language models may implicitly trust that these forecasts fall out of a coherent world model. In this paper, we evaluate the...
Extending the Price-and-Choose (P&C) mechanism of Echenique and Nunez (2025), we propose the Price-Accept-and-Choose (PA&C) mechanism, which preserves efficiency while eliminating P&C's first-mover advantage. We then analyze randomized and bidding variants and show that the resulting equilibrium payoffs correspond to standard...
We study a network formation game in which agents sponsor links at a linear cost in order to maximize centrality, defined as a weighted sum of walk counts with positive and weakly decreasing weights. This class includes Katz Bonacich centrality and total communicability and captures environments in which access decays with distance....
Two contestants with possibly different marginal costs compete across identical battlefields governed by a Tullock technology with discriminatory power at most one. A symmetric schedule divides a fixed prize according to the number of victories. Allowing for inactivity, unequal efforts across battlefields, and arbitrary mixed...
We study poverty minimization via direct transfers, framing this as a statistical learning problem while retaining the information constraints faced by real-world programs. Using nationally representative household consumption surveys from 34 countries that together account for 76% of the world's poor, we estimate that reducing the...
To study a scalar parameter, a researcher may consider multiple research designs. Based on the evidence across designs, the researcher may wish to formulate a headline estimate of the parameter. I examine how to choose this headline when it is unclear which design is most appropriate for studying the parameter. I model this setting by...
Inference in linear regression commonly treats OLS residuals as proxies for unobserved errors. This approximation can fail when the regression projection is nonlocal relative to the error-dependence structure. Residualization then shifts covariance information across observations and clusters, while conventional...
We establish the consistency and asymptotic normality of a two-step estimator of conditional expectiles in the context of conditional scale models. We first estimate the conditional variance parameters by quasi-maximum likelihood and then compute the unconditional expectile of the innovations using the empirical distribution of the...
We characterise the division rules for claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals, bilateral consistency, composition down, and composition up. The rules are precisely the members of a one-parameter log-exponential family $\{r^θ\}_{θ\in[-\infty,+\infty]}$, with constrained equal awards (CEA) and constrained equal losses...
The paper explores a theoretical freemium model for the sale of information, drawing on mathematical tools used in the study of repeated zero-sum games and Bayesian persuasion. Unlike standard Bayesian persuasion models, the information seller (IS) is indifferent to the actions taken by the information buyer (IB) and is concerned...
Policies with a common objective and implementation date may differ in details or context. We distinguish the aggregate average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) from sub-aggregate ATTs defined by implementation cohort, jurisdiction, period, or policy type. UN-DID and DID-INT, two DiD estimators that construct jurisdiction-by-time...
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming economic systems by altering production processes, labor markets, and the structure of firms and industries. AI is not merely a technological innovation. It is fundamentally a major economic phenomenon and a new wave of innovation with important implications for productivity,...
This paper examines how outside options are incorporated into payoff distributions in games with coalition structures. We introduce and characterize the alpha-value, which "fully" incorporates outside options, and provide a new characterization of the Aumann-Dreze value as an allocation rule that does not incorporate outside options....
Limited attention forces organizations to decide not only how much to discuss, but also which issues merit discussion. We study strategic communication about a multidimensional decision when a receiver can respond only along a few endogenously chosen issues. Players agree on the ideal action but prioritize different errors. In...
We propose the first manipulation test designed for boundary discontinuity designs (BDDs) with general boundary shapes. A BDD is a multidimensional extension of the regression discontinuity design (RDD) in which treatment assignment is determined by whether the multidimensional running variable crosses a lower-dimensional boundary...
We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown. We want such agents to act on our behalf so mechanisms must incentivize both honesty and obedience. A one-sided imitation structure---capabilities can be concealed but not...
We study identification and estimation of moments of random coefficients in short linear panels, allowing the number of heterogeneous coefficients to exceed the number of equations observed for each unit. Under moment homogeneity, different regressor histories impose restrictions on the same moment vector. We give necessary and...
When do text embeddings work as inputs to empirical analysis? Their use rests on an assumption: that we can trade text for its low-dimensional embedding, and lose little in doing so. I make that assumption precise under a generative model in which documents are mixtures of latent topics. I study two uses---clustering units in...
Tariff threats can move household beliefs before policy is enacted, yet their rapidly changing language is difficult to study with conventional surveys. We build a multi-agent system that turns 300 households from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers into persistent large-language-model agents exposed to social-media information over...
Posted prices for AI inference have fallen steadily since 2024, yet the measured speed of that fall depends almost entirely on the method of measurement. This paper constructs quality-adjusted price indices for the AI inference market from public data. The panel assembles 21,024 posted-price observations across 3,208 models and 86...
We develop a computational framework for Bayesian decision-making. We show that as long as no action is optimal in every state, Bayes-optimal choice is intractable. This hardness need not arise from large action, state, or signal spaces, nor from a complicated represented utility function: extracting enough information from a...
In centralized school choice, a designer who announces a mechanism may deviate from it to favor some students without being detected. A mechanism is credible if it admits no such deviation. We study this credibility problem when students do not know others' reports and may observe only part of the assignment. Credibility is demanding:...